The core and the Weber set of . . . by J. M. Bilbao & M. Ordóñez
Discrete Applied Mathematics 158 (2010) 180188
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Discrete Applied Mathematics
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/dam
The core and the Weber set of games on augmenting systems
J.M. Bilbao, M. Ordóñez
Department of Applied Mathematics II, University of Seville, Spain
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 15 October 2008
Received in revised form 17 September
2009
Accepted 24 September 2009
Available online 4 October 2009
Keywords:
Augmenting system
Core
Weber set
a b s t r a c t
This paper deals with cooperative games in which only certain coalitions are allowed to
form. There have been previous models developed to confront the problem of unallowable
coalitions. Games restricted by a communication graph were introduced by Myerson and
Owen. In their model, the feasible coalitions are those that induce connected subgraphs.
Another type of model is introduced in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink. In their model,
the possibilities of coalition formation are determined by the positions of the players in
a so-called permission structure. Faigle proposed a general model for cooperative games
defined on lattice structures. In this paper, the restrictions to the cooperation are given
by a combinatorial structure called augmenting system which generalizes antimatroid
structure and the system of connected subgraphs of a graph. In this framework, the core
and the Weber set of games on augmenting systems are introduced and it is proved that
monotone convex games have a non-empty core. Moreover, we obtain a characterization
of the convexity of these games in terms of the core of the game and the Weber set of the
extended game.
' 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Cooperative games under combinatorial restrictions are cooperative games in which the players have restricted
communication possibilities, which are defined by a combinatorial structure. The first model in which the restrictions are
defined by the connected subgraphs of a graph is introduced by Myerson [10]. Since then, many other situations where
players have communication restrictions have been studied in cooperative game theory. Contributions on graph-restricted
gamesincludeOwen[11],Borm,Owen,andTijs[4]andHamiache[8].Inthesemodelsthepossibilitiesofcoalitionformation
aredeterminedbythepositionsoftheplayersinacommunicationgraph.Anothertypeofcombinatorialstructureintroduced
by Gilles, Owen and van den Brink [7] and van den Brink [5] is equivalent to a subclass of antimatroids. This line of research
focuses on the possibilities of coalition formation determined by the positions of the players in the so-called permission
structure. Faigle [6] adopts a different point of view. He considers a non-empty collection of feasible coalitions and a game
defined on this collection and extends this game.
In the present paper, we use a restricted cooperation model derived from a combinatorial structure called augmenting
system, introduced by Bilbao [3]. In Section 2, we recall preliminaries on this combinatorial structure which is a
generalization of the antimatroid structure and the system of connected subgraphs of a graph. The aim of Section 3 is the
introduction of the non-negative core and the Weber set for a game on an augmenting system. In the classical situation, for
every cooperative game v V 2N ! R with v .;/ D 0, the core of v is contained in the Weber set. Moreover, v is convex if
and only if the Weber set coincides with the core of v. For a game v V F ! RC, where F  2N is an augmenting system,
the inclusion CoreC .N;v;F /  Weber .N;v;F / is not true. However, in Section 4 we show that for monotone convex
games on augmenting system, the Weber set is contained in the non-negative core which is non-empty. In the last section,
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we show that the superadditivity and a new concept of convexity are hereditary properties with respect to the extended
game
 
N;vF 
. Furthermore, we obtain the following characterization: A monotone game .N;v;F / is convex if and only if
CoreC .N;v;F / D Weber
 
N;vF 
:
2. Augmenting systems
ThissectionisbasedonBilbao[3].Itbasicallyrecallspreliminariesonaugmentingsystemsandsomeconceptsandresults
that will be used in the following. Let N be a finite set. A set system over N is a pair .N;F / where F  2N is a family of
subsets. The sets belonging to F are called feasible. We will write S [i and S ni instead of S [fig and S nfig respectively and
we will use the symbols  and  to denote strict inclusion and inclusion. We will recall the concept of augmenting system.
Definition 1. An augmenting system is a set system .N;F / with the following properties:
(P1) ; 2 F ,
(P2) for S;T 2 F with S \ T 6D ;, we have S [ T 2 F ;
(P3) for S;T 2 F with S  T, there exists i 2 T n S such that S [ i 2 F :
Example. The following collections of subsets of N D f1;:::;ng, given by F D 2N, F D f;;figg where i 2 N, and
F D f;;f1g;:::;fngg, are augmenting systems over N.
Example. Let us consider a communication graph G D .N;E/, where N is the set of players and E is the set of edges which
represents the bilateral communication between some players. Given a coalition S  N, the set of edges between players
in S is denoted by E.S/ D fij 2 E V i;j 2 Sg. Thus, the set system .N;F / given by
F D fS  N V .S;E.S// is a connected subgraph of Gg;
is an augmenting system.
Example. Gilles et al. [7] showed that the feasible coalition system .N;F / derived from the conjunctive or disjunctive
approachcontainstheemptyset,thegroundsetN,andthatitisclosedunderunion.Algabaetal.[1]showedthatthecoalition
systems derived from the conjunctive and disjunctive approach were identified to poset antimatroids and antimatroids with
the path property, respectively. The relationship between antimatroids and augmenting systems given by Bilbao [3] implies
that these coalition systems are augmenting systems.
The next property is proved by Algaba, Bilbao, and Slikker [2].
Theorem 2. An augmenting system .N;F / is the system of connected subgraphs of the graph G D .N;E/, where E D fS 2 F V
jSj D 2g if and only if fig 2 F for all i 2 N:
Example. The set system given by N D f1;2;3;4g and
F D f;;f1g;f4g;f1;2g;f1;3g;f2;4g;f3;4g;f1;2;3g;f1;2;4g;f1;3;4g;f2;3;4g;Ng:
is an augmenting system. Since f1;4g 62 F the system .N;F / is not an antimatroid. Moreover, f1;2g \ f2;4g D f2g 62 F
and hence .N;F / is not a convex geometry.
Let.N;F / be a set system and let S  N be a subset. The maximal non-empty feasible subsets of S are called components
of S. We denote by CF .S/ the set of the components of a subset S  N. Observe that the set CF .S/ may be the empty set.
This set will play a role in the extension of a game restricted by an augmenting system.
Proposition 3. A set system .N;F / satisfies property (P2) if and only if for any S  N with CF .S/ 6D ;, the components of S
form a partition of a subset of S.
Proof. See Proposition 2.9 in [3]. 
3. The Core and the Weber set of .N;v;F /
A cooperative game on the augmenting system .N;F / is a triple .N;v;F /, where v V F ! RC is a function with non-
negative real values such that v.;/ D 0. Given the game .N;v;F / we define a standard cooperative game vF V 2N ! RC,
named the extension of .N;v;F /, as
v
F .S/ D
X
T2CF .S/
v.T/ for all S  N:
Note that the family of components CF .S/ forms a partition of a subset of S, and vF .S/ D v.S/ for all S 2 F . Now, we
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Definition 4. Let .N;v;F / be a game on the augmenting system .N;F /. Then
CoreC .N;v;F / D

x 2 R
N
C V x.N/ D v
F .N/;x.S/  v.S/ for all S 2 F
	
and
Core
 
N;v
F 
D

x 2 R
N V x.N/ D v
F .N/;x.S/  v
F .S/ for all S  N
	
;
where we denote x.S/ D
P
i2S xi, and x.;/ D 0:
Proposition 5. The non-negative core of the game .N;v;F / coincides with the core of its extension .N;vF /:
Proof. Since Core
 
N;vF 
 CoreC.N;v;F /, we have Core.N;v;F / D ; implies Core
 
N;vF 
D ;. Then we can suppose
that CoreC.N;v;F / 6D ;. Next, we prove that for all x 2 CoreC.N;v;F / we have x 2 Core.N;vF /. Since x  0, we obtain
x.S/ D
X
T2CF .S/
x.T/ C x
 
S n
[
T2CF .S/
T
!

X
T2CF .S/
x.T/ 
X
T2CF .S/
v.T/ D v
F .S/
for all S  N. 
Proposition 6. The non-negative core of the game .N;v;F / is a polyhedron contained in the convex cone RN
C D fx 2 RN V
xi  0 for all i 2 Ng. Moreover, CoreC.N;v;F / is a bounded polyhedron or polytope.
Proof. Since CoreC.N;v;F / is given by a finite set of inequalities and
jxij D xi 
X
i2N
xi D v
F .N/
for every component of each x 2 CoreC.N;v;F /, we obtain the property. 
Let us consider a standard cooperative game v V 2N ! R with v.;/ D 0, and a total ordering of the elements of N, given
by i1 < i2 <  < in. Then we obtain the following chain of coalitions
;  C1    Cn 1  Cn D N
whereCk D fi1;:::;ikg  N,forallk D 1;:::;n.Themarginalworthvector aC 2 Rn withrespecttotheabovetotalordering
in the game .N;v/ is given by a
C
ik D v.Ck/   v.Ck 1/, for all k D 1;:::;n.
The Weber set of the game .N;v/ is the convex hull of the marginal worth vectors, i.e., Weber.N;v/ D convfaC V C is a
total ordering of Ng. It is easy to show that
k X
jD1
a
C
ij D v.Ck/ for all k D 1;:::;n:
In our model, we can consider the compatible orderings of an augmenting system .N;F / with N 2 F , as the total
orderings of N, i1 < i2 <  < in such that the set

i1;:::;ij
	
2 F for all j D 1;:::;n. A compatible ordering of .N;F /
corresponds exactly to a chain of length n in F and we denote by Ch.F / the set of all the chains of length n of F .
Definition 7. The Weber set of a game .N;v;F / is given by
Weber.N;v;F / D convfa
C V C 2 Ch.F /g:
The next property follows from the definition of aC.
Proposition 8. Let .N;F / be an augmenting system with N 2 F . If .N;v;F / is a game and C 2 Ch.F / then
X
i2S
a
C
i D v.S/ for all S 2 C:
Weber [13] showed that any game v V 2N ! R satisfies Core.N;v/  Weber .N;v/. This property may not hold for a
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Example. Let N D f1;2;3g and let F D f;;f1g;f2g;f1;2g;f1;3g;Ng. We define the game v V F ! RC by v.;/ D v .f1g/
D v .f2g/ D 0, v .f1;2g/ D 1 and v .f1;3g/ D v .N/ D 2. Notice that
CoreC.N;v;F / D

x 2 R
3
C V x.N/ D 2;x1 C x2  1;x1 C x3  2
	
D

x 2 R
3
C V x.N/ D 2;x1  1;x2 D 0;x3  1
	
D convf.1;0;1/;.2;0;0/g:
There are three chains of length n in F given by
C1 V ;  f1g  f1;2g  f1;2;3g;
C2 V ;  f1g  f1;3g  f1;2;3g;
C3 V ;  f2g  f1;2g  f1;2;3g:
The marginal worth vectors are
a
C1 D .v.f1g/   v.;/; v.f1;2g/   v.f1g/; v.N/   v.f1;2g// D .0;1;1/;
a
C2 D .v.f1g/   v.;/; v.N/   v .f1;3g/; v.f1;3g/   v.f1g// D .0;0;2/;
a
C3 D .v.f1;2g/   v.f2g/; v.f2g/   v.;/; v.N/   v.f1;2g// D .1;0;1/;
and hence we obtain
Weber.N;v;F / D convf.1;0;1/;.0;1;1/;.0;0;2/g:
Then we have that
CoreC.N;v;F / 6 Weber.N;v;F / and Weber.N;v;F / 6 CoreC.N;v;F /:
4. Monotone convex games
A cooperative game.N;;F / is monotone if for all S;T 2 F with S  T, we havev.S/  v.T/. In general, the extension  
N;vF 
of a monotone game .N;v;F / is not necessarily monotone as the next example shows.
Example. Let N D f1;2;3;4g and we consider the augmenting system
F D f;;f1g;f4g;f1;2g;f3;4g;f1;2;3g;f2;3;4g;Ng:
The game v V F ! RC defined by v.S/ D 1 for every non-empty S 2 F , and v.;/ D 0 is monotone. The extension vF
yields
v
F .f1;4g/ D v .f1g/ C v .f4g/ D 2 > 1 D v
F .N/:
Shapley [12] introduces the notion of convexity for cooperative games v V 2N ! R such that v.S/ C .T/  v.S \ T/
C v.S [ T/, for all S;T  N. Ichiishi [9] obtained the following characterization of convex games: .N;v/ is convex if and
only if Core.N;v/ D Weber .N;v/.
Let us consider a game v V F ! RC, where F  2N. In this restricted game, the above convexity inequalities could be
applied to feasible coalitions S;T 2 F such that S \ T 2 F and S [ T 2 F . However, they are not sufficient to ensure that
the extended game vF V 2N ! RC be convex.
Example. Let F D f;;f1g;f2g;f1;3g;f2;3g;f1;2;3gg be an augmenting system and the restricted game v V F ! RC is
given by v.;/ D v .f1g/ D v .f2g/ D 0, and v .f1;3g/ D v .f2;3g/ D v .f1;2;3g/ D 1. This restricted game v is monotone
and satisfies the convexity inequalities, but its extended game vF is not convex because
v
F .f1;3g/ C v
F .f2;3g/ D 2 > 1 D v
F .f3g/ C v
F .f1;2;3g/:
Then we introduce the following concept of convexity for restricted games.
Definition 9. A cooperative game .N;v;F / is said to be convex if for all S;T 2 F with S [ T 2 F , we have
v.S/ C v.T/ 
X
C2CF .S\T/
v.C/ C v.S [ T/:
Note that if F D 2N then the above inequality is the classical convexity.
Theorem 10. Let .N;F / be an augmenting system such that N 2 F . If the game v V F ! RC is monotone convex then
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Proof. Since ;;N 2 F , property (P3) of the augmenting systems implies the existence of a chain of length n of feasible
coalitions
;  C1    Cn 1  Cn D N
where Cj D fi1;:::;ijg 2 F for all j D 1;:::;n. We define the corresponding marginal worth vector x 2 RN
C as follows:
xi1 D v.C1/; xij D v.Cj/   v.Cj 1/; j D 2;:::;n:
Note that
x.Cj/ D
j X
kD1
xik D v.Cj/
for all j D 1;:::;n and x.N/ D v.N/. Since v is monotone we obtain xij  0 for all j D 1;:::;n.
We will show that x.S/  v.S/ for any S 2 F . For this, we consider S 2 F such that S 6D Cj for all j D 1;:::;n and
suppose that S is a minimal, with respect to the inclusion, feasible coalition such that x.S/ < v.S/.
Since ;  C1    Cn 1  Cn D N is a chain of length n, there exists j 2 f1;:::;ng such that S  Cj and S 6 Cj 1.
Then ij 2 S and hence S [ Cj 1 D Cj 2 F . By applying the convexity of v to the feasible coalitions S and Cj 1 we obtain
v.S/ C v.Cj 1/ 
X
T2CF .S\Cj 1/
v.T/ C v.Cj/:
Note that S is minimal feasible coalition such that x.S/ < v.S/ and for each T 2 CF .S \ Cj 1/ we have T  S. Thus
x.T/  v.T/ for all T 2 CF .S \ Cj 1/. Since x  0, we deduce
x.S/ C x.Cj 1/ D x.S [ Cj 1/ C x.S \ Cj 1/
D v.Cj/ C x.S \ Cj 1/
 v.Cj/ C
X
T2CF .S\Cj 1/
x.T/
 v.Cj/ C
X
T2CF .S\Cj 1/
v.T/
 v.S/ C v.Cj 1/:
By using x.Cj 1/ D v.Cj 1/ we conclude that x.S/  v.S/, which is a contradiction. 
Corollary 11. Let .N;F / be an augmenting system such that N 2 F . If the game .N;v;F / is monotone convex then
Weber.N;v;F /  CoreC.N;v;F /:
Moreover, any marginal worth vector is a vertex of CoreC.N;v;F /.
Proof. For all C 2 Ch.F / the marginal worth vector aC belongs to the convex set CoreC.N;v;F /. Thus convfaC V C 2
Ch.F /g  CoreC.N;v;F /. Given aC 2 CoreC.N;v;F /, we have aC.Cj/ D v.Cj/ for all feasible coalition belonging to chain
C of length n. Then we obtain n equations which are linearly independent and therefore its solution aC is a vertex of the
polytope CoreC.N;v;F /. 
Definition 12. A game .N;v;F / is superadditive if for all S;T 2 F with S \ T D ; and S [ T 2 F , we have v.S/ C v.T/
 v.S [ T/:
We observe that every convex game is superadditive.
Proposition 13. Let .N;F / be an augmenting system such that N 2 F . If Weber.N;v;F /  CoreC.N;v;F / then the game
.N;v;F / is superadditive.
Proof. Let S;T 2 F with S \ T D ; and S [ T 2 F . Then there exists a chain C which contains S [ T and we take
x D aC 2 Core.N;v;F /. Thus we conclude that v.S [ T/ D x.S [ T/ D x.S/ C x.T/  v.S/ C v.T/: 
5. Hereditary properties of .N;v;F /
In this section, we show that the superadditivity and the convexity of a monotone game .N;v;F / imply the
corresponding property of the extended game
 
N;vF 
.
Theorem 14. Let .N;F / be an augmenting system such that N 2 F . If .N;v;F / is a monotone superadditive game then the
game
 
N;vF 
is superadditive and monotone.J.M. Bilbao, M. Ordóñez / Discrete Applied Mathematics 158 (2010) 180188 185
Proof. Suppose that
 
N;vF 
is not superadditive. Then there exist coalitions S;T  N with S \ T D ; and components
CF .S/ D fS1;:::;Sng; CF .T/ D fT1;:::;Tmg;
such that vF .S/ C vF .T/ > vF .S [ T/ and that n is minimal among those choices of coalitions for which the inequality
holds.
If n  2 we consider the coalitions S n Sn and Sn. Note that jCF .Sn/j D 1 and jCF .S n Sn/j D n   1, since otherwise Sn is
not a maximal feasible subset of S. Then we have
v
F .S n Sn/ C v
F .Sn [ T/  v
F .S [ T/;
v
F .Sn/ C v
F .T/  v
F .Sn [ T/:
Thus, we obtain
v
F .S [ T/  v
F .S n Sn/ C v
F .Sn/ C v
F .T/ D v
F .S/ C v
F .T/;
which is a contradiction. Hence we conclude that n D 1:
Now CF .S/ D fS1g, CF .T/ D fT1;:::;Tmg, such that vF .S/ C vF .T/ > vF .S [ T/ and we assume that m is as small as
possible among all such counterexamples. We next consider the following three cases.
(i) The set CF .S [ T/ D

S0
1;T0
1;:::;T0
m
	
where S1  S0
1 and Ti  T0
i for all i D 1;:::;m. Since v is monotone,
v
F .S/ C v
F .T/ D v .S1/ C v .T1/ C  C v .Tm/
 v
 
S0
1

C v
 
T0
1

C  C v
 
T0
m

D v
F .S [ T/;
and this gives a contradiction.
(ii) The set CF .S [T/ D

C;T0
pC1;:::;T0
m
	
where 1  p < m, Ti  T0
i for all i D pC1;:::;m and S1 [T1 [[Tp  C.
Then
v
F .S/ C v
F .T/ D v
F .S/ C v
F
 
T n
m [
iDpC1
Ti
!
C v
F
 
m [
iDpC1
Ti
!
:
Since jCF .S/j D 1 and
 CF
 
T n
Sm
iDpC1 Ti
  D p < m, we obtain
v
F .S/ C v
F
 
T n
m [
iDpC1
Ti
!
 v
F
 
.S [ T/ n
m [
iDpC1
Ti
!
:
Moreover, using
 CF
 
.S [ T/ n
Sm
iDpC1 Ti
  D 1 and
 CF
 Sm
iDpC1 Ti
  D m   p < m, we deduce that
v
F
 
.S [ T/ n
m [
iDpC1
Ti
!
C v
F
 
m [
iDpC1
Ti
!
 v
F .S [ T/:
Therefore, vF .S/ C vF .T/  vF .S [ T/ and this is a contradiction.
(iii) The set CF .S [T/ D fCg where S1 [T1 [[Tm  C. Since S1  C and S1 is a maximal feasible subset of S there
exists a chain of feasible coalitions
S1 D S
0
1  S
1
1    S
k
1    C;
such that S
k
1 n S
k 1
1 D

tk	
 T for all k D 1;:::;jC n S1j: Moreover, T1 [  [ Tm  C and we may select the first
coalition S
p
1 in the chain such that S
p
1 \ Tj 6D ; for some j 2 f1;:::;mg. It follows that S
p
1 [ Tj 2 F . Note that S
p
1 \ Tj D ftpg
and hence S
p
1 n ftpg 2 F satisfying
 
S
p
1 n

t
p	
[ Tj D S
p
1 [ Tj and
 
S
p
1 n

t
p	
\ Tj D ;:
By using the superadditivity of v, we have
v
 
S
p
1 n

t
p	
C v
 
Tj

 v
 
S
p
1 [ Tj

D v
F  
S
p
1 [ Tj

:
Therefore,
v
F .S/ C v
F .T/ D v .S1/ C v
 
Tj

C v
F  
T n Tj

 v
 
S
p
1 n

t
p	
C v
 
Tj

C v
F  
T n Tj

 v
F  
S
p
1 [ Tj

C v
F  
T n Tj

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Since

CF .S
p
1 [ Tj/

 D 1 and

CF
 
T n Tj

 D m   1 < m; we obtain
v
F  
S
p
1 [ Tj

C v
F  
T n Tj

 v
F  
S
p
1 [ T

D v
F .S1 [ T/ D v
F .S [ T/;
and this contradiction completes the proof of the superadditivity of vF .
Finally, we will show that vF is monotone. Let S;T  N with S  T. Since vF is superadditive and vF .T n S/  0, we
conclude that vF .S/  vF .S/ C vF .T n S/  vF .T/: 
Remark 15. We present in the Appendix an alternative proof of Theorem 14 proposed by an anonymous reviewer.
Theorem 16. Let .N;F / be an augmenting system such that N 2 F . If .N;v;F / is a monotone convex game then the game  
N;vF 
is convex.
Proof. We remark first that
 
N;vF 
is superadditive and monotone. Next, suppose that
 
N;vF 
is not convex. Then there
exist coalitions S;T  N with components
CF .S/ D fS1;:::;Sng; CF .T/ D fT1;:::;Tmg;
such that vF .S/CvF .T/ > vF .S \ T/CvF .S [ T/ and that n is minimal among all pairs of coalitions satisfying the above
inequality.
Suppose that n  2 and let S n Sn and Sn, where jCF .Sn/j D 1 and jCF .S n Sn/j D n   1. Then we have
v
F .S n Sn/ C v
F .Sn [ T/  v
F ..S n Sn/ \ T/ C v
F .S [ T/;
v
F .Sn/ C v
F .T/  v
F .Sn \ T/ C v
F .Sn [ T/:
We note that
..S n Sn/ \ T/ [ .Sn \ T/ D ..S n Sn/ [ Sn/ \ T D S \ T;
..S n Sn/ \ T/ \ .Sn \ T/ D ;:
The superadditivity of vF implies
v
F .S \ T/  v
F ..S n Sn/ \ T/ C v
F .Sn \ T/:
Therefore,
v
F .S \ T/  v
F .S n Sn/ C v
F .Sn [ T/   v
F .S [ T/ C v
F .Sn/ C v
F .T/   v
F .Sn [ T/
D v
F .S/ C v
F .T/   v
F .S [ T/;
and this contradicts the hypothesis that n  2:
We thus have CF .S/ D fS1g and we assume that m is as small as possible. There are two possible cases:
(i) The intersection S1 \
 Sm
jD1 Tj

D ; so that S1 \ Tj D ; for all j D 1;:::;m: Since vF is superadditive and monotone,
we obtain
v
F .S/ C v
F .T/ D v
F .S1/ C v
F
 
m [
jD1
Tj
!
 v
F .S1 [ T1 [  [ Tm/
 v
F .S [ T/;
which is a contradiction.
(ii) There exists at least p 2 f1;:::;mg such that S1 \ Tp 6D ;. Since S1 \ Tp 6D ;; property (P2) implies that S1 [ Tp 2 F
and applying the convexity of v;
v
F .S/ C v
F .T/ D v .S1/ C v
 
Tp

C v
F  
T n Tp


X
C2CF .S1\Tp/
v .C/ C v
 
S1 [ Tp

C v
F  
T n Tp

D v
F .S1 \ Tp/ C v
F  
S1 [ Tp

C v
F  
T n Tp

:
By using the monotonicity of vF , we obtain
v
F .S/ C v
F .T/  v
F .S \ Tp/ C v
F  
S [ Tp

C v
F  
T n Tp

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Since

CF .S [ Tp/

 D 1 and

CF .T n Tp/

 D m   1 < m, we have
v
F  
S [ Tp

C v
F  
T n Tp

 v
F   
S [ Tp

\
 
T n Tp

C v
F .S [ T/
D v
F  
S \
 
T n Tp

C v
F .S [ T/:
From the superadditivity of vF , we deduce that
v
F .S \ Tp/ C v
F  
S \
 
T n Tp

 v
F .S \ T/:
Therefore,
v
F .S/ C v
F .T/  v
F .S \ T/ C v
F .S [ T/;
and this contradiction completes the proof. 
Corollary 17. Let .N;F / be an augmenting system such that N 2 F and let .N;v;F / be a monotone game. Then .N;v;F / is
convex if and only if
 
N;vF 
is convex.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the convexity of
 
N;vF 
implies that .N;v;F / is convex. Let us consider S;T 2 F with
S [ T 2 F . Then
v
F .S/ C v
F .T/  v
F .S \ T/ C v
F .S [ T/;
which implies
v.S/ C v.T/ 
X
C2CF .S\T/
v.C/ C v.S [ T/;
and we obtain the result. 
By using Proposition 5 and the classical characterization of convex games, we obtain the following characterization of
the convexity for games on augmenting systems.
Theorem 18. Let .N;F / be an augmenting system such that N 2 F and let .N;v;F / be a monotone game. Then .N;v;F / is
convex if and only if CoreC.N;v;F / D Weber
 
N;vF 
:
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Appendix
An anonymous reviewer propose the following proof of Theorem 14. In our opinion it is a nice and transparent
demonstration.
Proof. We split up the proof into two parts. First, we prove that monotonicity and superadditivity of a restricted game
.N;v;F / imply that .N;v;F / is proper, that is, v .S/  v .S1/ C  C v .Sk/ for all S 2 F , and pairwise disjoint subsets
S1;:::;Sk 2 F of S.
Suppose on the contrary that
v .S/ <
k X
jD1
v
 
Sj

; (1)
where S 2 F , and S1;:::;Sk 2 F are pairwise disjoint subsets of S. We may choose these feasible coalitions such that
k C

S0
 is minimal among those choices of feasible coalitions for which (1) holds, with S0 D S n
Sk
jD1 Sj. Since .N;F / is an
augmenting system and S1  S, it follows from property (P3) that there exists i 2 S n S1 such that S1 [ i 2 F . If i 2 S0 then
due to the choice of S and S1;:::;Sk we must have
v .S/  v .S1 [ i/ C
k X
jD2
v
 
Sj

D
k X
jD1
v
 
Sj

C v .S1 [ i/   v .S1/
> v .S/ C v .S1 [ i/   v .S1/;188 J.M. Bilbao, M. Ordóñez / Discrete Applied Mathematics 158 (2010) 180188
and hence v .S1/ > v .S1 [ i/. Applying monotonicity we arrive at a contradiction, and we therefore conclude that i 62 S0,
i.e., there exists an index r 6D 1 with i 2 Sr.
Let S00 denote .S1 [ i/ [ Sr D S1 [ Sr, which is feasible according to property (P2). Again, due to the choice of S and
S1;:::;Sk we must have
v .S/  v
 
S00
C
k X
jD2;j6Dr
v
 
Sj

> v .S/ C v
 
S00
  v .S1/   v .Sr/:
Therefore, v .S1 [ Sr/ D v
 
S00
< v .S1/ C v .Sr/ and this contradicts the superadditivity of .N;v;F /. We conclude that
.N;v;F / is proper.
Next, we will show that the extended game
 
N;vF 
is superadditive. Let S;T  N be disjoint coalitions. Let S1;:::;Ss 2
F , T1;:::;Tt 2 F , and U1;:::;Um 2 F denote the components of S, T, and S [ T. Observe that Sk  Uj or Sk \ Uj D ; for
each combination of components Sk and Uj since otherwise (P2) implies Uj  Sk [ Uj 2 F contradicting the maximality of
Uj in S [ T. The same holds for the components of T and U.
Since the restricted game .N;v;F / is proper and the components of S and T are pairwise disjoint, we have for each
j D 1;:::;m;
v
 
Uj


s X
kD1
v
 
Uj \ Sk

C
t X
rD1
v
 
Uj \ Tr

:
For each index k D 1;:::;s we have Sk  Uq for exactly one index q 2 f1;:::;mg, and this holds also for the components
of T. Therefore, we have
v .Sk/ D
m X
jD1
v
 
Uj \ Sk

for each k D 1;:::;s;
v .Tr/ D
m X
jD1
v
 
Uj \ Tr

for each r D 1;:::;t:
We now deduce that
v
F .S [ T/ D
m X
jD1
v
 
Uj


m X
jD1
 
s X
kD1
v
 
Uj \ Sk

C
t X
rD1
v
 
Uj \ Tr

!
D
s X
kD1
m X
jD1
v
 
Uj \ Sk

C
t X
rD1
m X
jD1
v
 
Uj \ Tr

D
s X
kD1
v .Sk/ C
t X
rD1
v .Tr/
D v
F .S/ C v
F .T/:
This shows the superadditivity of
 
N;vF 
. 
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